Threats to the American Grid
Section 1: What I Know, Assume, or Imagine
If the entire American power grid was shut down or wiped out, it could take years to get it back running. The collapse of the power grid could result from something as simple as a powerful solar flare or a cyberattack by a rogue nation state. I have had a casual interest in power generation and distribution for several years. I have read about the necessity of major upgrades to the American power grid to achieve climate change targets and maintain the stability of what is currently a very old, very vulnerable grid.
However, I have never put significant thought in to how it could collapse. I’ve read articles or seen videos where pundits claim that foreign powers are already inside the computers running the grid, waiting for the right moment to press a button, triggering a catastrophic collapse. I’ve seen a video about how humanity has narrowly avoided cataclysm, and how several times we’ve lucked out and avoided a massive solar storm that could destroy the power grid globally if Earth had been just a little bit further along in her orbit. I find this harrowing in a way. We all take for granted how easy it is to plug in appliances, the wonders of electric lights and the utility of having an always charged device on our persons at all times. It so easily could go away, in an instant. So, I want to know what plans are in place to prevent this. Is a powerful solar flare our doom? Can we protect the grid from cyber-attacks? And if we don’t what are the likely consequences?
Section 2 – The Search Process and Discoveries
Part A- The Search Methodology
To start out, I had to identify search terms to maximize the potential of my search. First I did a general search on the UW Libraries site. Overwhelmed with articles I decided to find a reference source. Using the Gale Virtual Reference Library, I found my reference source using the keywords, “power grid” and “protect.” Moving on to look for my other sources I used databases like Academic Search complete, Web of Science, ACM Digital Library and UW Libraries, throughout “power grid” remained a constant in my searches. Other search terms arose focusing on specific threats to the power grid such as “cyber-attack”, “geomagnetic storm”, “physical attack” and “extreme weather.” Many sources I found were hyper-specific and indecipherable, so it was a challenge to find those that I could understand and that were helpful for my paper. It did not get much easier over the course of this project but by evaluating page after page of results and mixing and matching search terms I was able to eventually find useful research articles. Later on I did find multiple sources using the IEEE Xplore database, though not every one made it into this paper.
Part B: Discoveries and New Information (What you Found)
Cyberattacks are one of many threats grid operators face. And while still a relatively new threat, several large attacks have occurred. Much of the world first became aware of the threat of cyberattacks on physical systems after the attack on industrial control equipment in 2010’s Stuxnet worm attack, in which the computers controlling centrifuges used to enrich uranium were commanded to vary their speeds outside of designed operating windows (Farwell and Rohozinki 24-25). An estimated 10-20% of the centrifuges were destroyed in the attack, briefly stymieing the Iranian nuclear program (Weiss and Weiss 6). This attack was one of the first state sponsored cyberattacks. While it had a minimal impact on its target, the implications were massive; Even the most secure computers in the world such as those targeted by Stuxnet are vulnerable and unlike the Iranian computers, which were air gapped—disconnected from the internet--the computers controlling grids across the world today are connected to the internet. The biggest cyberattack on a power grid operator so far was the 2015 cyberattack on the Ukrainian power grid. Operators watched helpless as their cursors moved across their screens without input and other computers locked up as breakers were thrown electronically (Zetter). The cyberattack resulted in the shutting down of 30 substations, leaving 230,000 people without power (Goudarzi et al. 17). This has terrifying implications. Large cyberattacks affecting power grids have already happened so it is only a matter of time before it happens again. In a world with higher political tensions and with power grids becoming more and more computerized steps will need to be taken to protect and preserve them from this avenue of attack. An additional concern is that, “Most transformers are made outside the United States” (McBeath 135). Foreign manufacturers could place vulnerabilities or back doors into their hardware and in worst-case scenarios such as sanctions or war, power grid operators would struggle to replace them. A large cyberattack could cost in excess of $700 billion and leave 70 percent of the US without power for 6 months (Kshetri and Voas 92). Many of America’s critical systems rely on the constant flow of electricity, like our food supply or our gas pumps. With power out at grocery stores and gas pumps unable to pump, many would starve.
Another threat to our power grid is the geomagnetic storm. Geomagnetic storms are caused by coronal mass ejections, eruptions of plasma from the sun which can interact with Earth’s magnetic field. They are the source of the northern and southern lights but also can induce currents in electrical equipment, causing damage (Weiss and Weiss 2). The most recent and impactful storm occurred on March 13th, 1989. In some places it caused minor damage; in New Jersey a major transformer blew at a nuclear power plant (Weiss and Weiss 2). And in the United Kingdom two transformers were destroyed (Eastwood et al. 2053). However, the most significant damage occurred in Québec. In less than 90 seconds the entire Québec grid collapsed (Bolduc 1794). The storm left millions without power (Odenwald). The final cost of the damage to Québec’s grid was found to have been $13.2 million (Bolduc 1794). However, this is only the most impactful event in recent times. To get a better understanding of geomagnetic storm’s threat to our grid the May 1921 Railroad storm and the 1859 Carrington event must be understood. The 1859, Carrington event, is the largest geomagnetic storm ever recorded (Weiss and Weiss 2). The Aurora was seen as far south as the Caribbean and “Campers in the Rocky Mountains were awakened shortly after midnight by ‘an auroral light so bright that one could easily read common print. Some of the party insisted it was daylight and began preparation for breakfast.’” The Carrington event caused little damage as it predated the modern electrical grid; however, the Railroad storm was a different matter. In May, 1921, there was a large geomagnetic storm known as the New York Railroad storm. While electricity was not yet widespread, telegraph wires did cross the country at this time and the geomagnetic storm induced currents in the wires causing them to heat up, electrocute operators and destroy equipment (Weiss and Weiss 2). In some cases, the damage was worse, “excessive electric currents on telephone lines caused the Union Railroad Station in Albany, New York, to catch fire; the station burned to the ground” and the signaling systems of the New York Central Railroad were destroyed grinding the railway to a halt (Love et al. 1288). “The National Academy of Sciences estimates that if that storm occurred today, it could cause 1–2 trillion dollars damage and full recovery could take 4–10 years” (Weiss and Weiss 2).
Power grid infrastructure is vulnerable to extreme weather events and with the progression of climate change, extreme weather events are becoming more common. Consequently, the power grid is at more risk than ever. High winds or large snow fall can knock trees down into power lines, power plants and substations can flood and extreme heat or extreme cold can lead to rolling blackouts. Hurricanes are massive storms which cause severe damage to power grids and have been becoming more powerful as a result of climate change. Historically, the “top ten hurricanes that have made landfall in the United States have occurred mostly since 2001 (the one exception was Hurricane Andrew in 1992)” (William et al.). Hurricane Sandy in 2012 “left 8.5 million people without power” and Hurricane Irma in 2017 left 6.7 million people without power (Daeli et al. 1). However, hurricanes aren’t the only climate change empowered weather events that can cause substantial damage to the grid. Extreme cold requires more energy to heat homes and improperly prepared electrical infrastructure can fail. In February of 2021 the Texas grid collapsed as record cold weather swept the state. The temperature in Galveston was down to 20°F and in Houston temperatures plummeted to just 13°F (NOAA). Freezing temperatures turned the fuel in unprepared fuel pipelines to slush, equipment froze and condensation froze to wind turbine blades (Busby et al. 2). Texas’ grid ground to a halt. “The state’s extreme winter planning scenario estimated at most 14 GW of outages, but by Monday morning, more than 30 GW of generating capacity was unavailable”, the most in US history (Busby et al. 2). At least 246 people lost their lives as a result of the blackout (Hellerstedt 2). Some estimates put the number dead as high as 814 (Weber and Buchele).
These threats have been known for some time but that does not mean they have been addressed. When it comes to Geomagnetic storms and HA-EMP’s (High Altitude Electromagnetic pulses) – which adversely affect the grid using the same mechanism – in some cases nothing has been done. For example, Congressman Trent Franks Republican of Arizona, has proposed a bill that would require grid operators to implement measures to protect against Geomagnetic storms and HA-EMP’s. Franks was told that his bill would be brought to the Arizona House floor for vote; however, House Energy and Commerce Committee Chairman Fred Upton – Republican of Michigan – let it die in committee. The aforementioned Fred Upton, “between the years of 2011 and 2016, has received $1,180,000 in campaign contributions from the electric utility industry” (Weiss and Weiss 4). Preceding the 2021 Texas power crisis the state previously weathered a severe winter in 2011 that put significant strain on their power generation. As found by Weiqi Pan and Yang Li, no changes were made, even after suggestions from the state government because it was to cost prohibitive and any operators that would have implemented the changes would not have been able to be cost competitive (6).
Section III: Conclusions About What I Discovered
I have learned much about the existential threats to the American power grid. Prior to researching this topic, I didn’t know much more than that Geomagnetic storms and cyber attacks were a threat. I have also learned about others like climate change and physical attacks. Unfortunately, there is very little research about physical attacks currently, but it is relevant with the rash of attacks on substations in recent months. Such as the ones that occurred in Pierce County during December 2022. More Geomagnetic storms will happen, more extreme weather events will happen, and cyber attacks happen every day. Though we do not hear it very often in the media. Therefore, from what I have learned, I would say that this is an issue that is being ignored and needs to be addressed. Reading about how grid operators bribed government officials to be lax on laws requiring more robust infrastructure was disheartening. There needs to be hardening of the grid from all these threats. We rely on electricity for literally everything in our modern lives and without it our society would collapse.
Works Cited
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Weber, Andrew, and Mose Buchele. “Texas Has an Official Death Count from the 2021 Blackout. The True Toll May Never Be Known.” KERA News, KERA, 4 Aug. 2022, https://www.keranews.org/health-wellness/2022-08-04/texas-has-an-official-death-count-from-the-2021-blackout-the-true-toll-may-never-be-known.
Weiss, Matthew, and Martin Weiss. “An Assessment of Threats to the American Power Grid.” Energy, Sustainability and Society, vol. 9, no. 1, 2019, pp. 1–9, https://doi.org/10.1186/s13705-019-0199-y.
Zetter, Kim. “Inside the Cunning, Unprecedented Hack of Ukraine's Power Grid.” Wired, Conde Nast, 3 Mar. 2016, https://www.wired.com/2016/03/inside-cunning-unprecedented-hack-ukraines-power-grid/.